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I.

Introduction

The right to an attorney when facing criminal charges has not always been a part of the
judicial system which meant historically, an individual’s ability to afford legal representation
greatly influenced judicial outcomes. Although landmark Supreme Court cases have expanded
the rights of indigent clients, the implementation and oversight of attorneys tasked with
representing this group of individuals remains controversial and inconsistent. Powell v. Alabama
(287 U.S. 45 (1932)) marked one of the first cases in which the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of retaining legal representation before the court but it was not until 1963’s Gideon v.
Wainwright (372 U.S. 335 (1963) ruling that the court granted all people facing criminal charges
the right to an attorney, regardless of inability to pay. This ruling established the position of
public defenders, attorneys employed by the public to represent individuals facing criminal
charges who are unable to afford legal counsel, as an integral component in the judicial process.
Not all states utilize the same method to fund and oversee indigent representation and draw the
most apparent distinction based on whether implementation occurs at the state or county level. A
significant amount of literature already examines these differences further by comparing the
efficacy between public defenders, private attorneys, and appointed counsel. However, there still
remains a lack of research examining the factors that principally affect case outcomes.
Although the number of public defender offices has increased substantially in the past
fifty years, the performance of public defenders remains heavily criticized for often lacking
proper training, resources, time, and money to properly litigate cases (Hartley, Miller, and
Spohn, 2010). Despite the fact that some may be skeptical of policies that work to protect the
rights of the accused and guilty, the presumption of innocence before a blind lady justice is the
bedrock on which our judicial system operates and requires equal access to legal representation.
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This paper will examine the unsettling pressure placed upon public defenders to seek a plea deal
rather than advocate up to the trial stage as a result of insufficient resources. A pressure that
Stephanos Bibas, a leading scholar in criminal justice procedure, argues only adds an additional
layer of subjectivity which can cause a deviation from the expected trial outcome (2004). This
subjectivity can also be influenced by implicit racial bias resulting in outcomes affected by race
(Richardson and Goff, 2013).
My research pulls data from the 2007 National Prosecutors Survey and the 2007 Census
of Public Defender Offices: County-Based and Local Offices. By using variables found in both
data sets, the results from the regression analysis seek to answer whether increased funding and
reduced caseload affect jury trial rates in county-based public defender offices. A significant
amount of literature points to the lack of resources and funds and the overburdened workload of
public defenders as explanations for the problems associated with public defense. Therefore, an
increase in budgets within public defender offices and a reduction in caseload should result in a
positive correlation with jury trial rate.
II.

History and Importance of Public Defense

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declare the right to have “assistance of
counsel for his defense.” This definition was narrowly interpreted by the court until it decided in
the case Gideon v. Wainwright, that a defendant unable to afford an attorney could not possibly
receive a fair trial without the same financial capital. In addition to the ruling Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Argersinger v. Hamlin (407 U.S. 25 (1972))
concluded that the protections for accused apply to juveniles as well. Most recently, the Supreme
Court expanded the precursors for gaining access to an attorney by ruling that the right to an
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attorney also applies to suspended sentences in the case Alabama v. Shelton (535 US 654
(2002)).
Since the court’s establishment of the right to legal counsel, public defenders have played
an increasingly important role in maintaining equity within the courtroom. Between 1951 and the
1963 Gideon ruling, the number of public defender offices grew from 7 to 136 (Hartley, Miller,
and Spohn, 2010). More recently, a 2007 Bureau of Justice Statistics report found an overall 957
public defender offices that received more than 5.5 million cases in the year 2007 and employed
more than 15,000 full-time attorneys (Census of Public Defender Office, 2009). In Supreme
Court Justice Black’s opinion on Gideon v. Wainwright, he contended that the noble idea of
substantive constitutional safeguards cannot be realized if the poor man is forced to face his
accusers without a lawyer. The Supreme Court opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma demonstrated the
integral role indigent defense plays in guaranteeing due process by contending that justice cannot
be equal when poverty precludes meaningful representation. Additionally, due process does not
mean mere access to the courthouse doors but demands access to “raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense. Without the assistance of legal counsel for indigent individuals
equal to that of their adversary, a clear distinction between rich and poor would persist (470 US
68 (1985)).
III.

Problems faced by public defenders

However, persistent problems in public defense throughout the country stifle efforts to
maintain equality in the court system making the guaranteed right to counsel a well-established
principle in theory but inadequately put into practice. The court system still exists as a two-tiered
system subjecting poor to a system under-resourced when compared to individuals who can
afford legal representation. One of the main reasons why this inequality continues to persist is
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the insufficient level of funds provided to public defense offices (Lucas, 2013). The problem of
underfunding public defense has worsened following the recent economic downturn, leaving
many offices unable to represent clients with the level of zeal and time necessary (Lucas, 2013).
In the last forty years the incarceration rate has increased by 500% and has left offices within the
criminal justice system scrambling to keep up with a budget that does not match this caseload
(The Sentencing Project, 2015). Public defenders consistently lack funds to perform basic tasks
such as interviewing witnesses, clients, or retaining experts for trial (Ogletree, 1995).
Gideon may have defined the right to an attorney when facing criminal charges, but it did
not define how these systems should be run or funded. As a result, many states vary in the
portion of funds provided by the state and county level to support public defense but what does
remain consistent is a persistent lack of funds available (National Right to Counsel Committee
(NRCC), 2009). For some states like Georgia, public defender offices rely on special funds that
are not reliable sources of revenue and do not remain consistent year to year (NRCC, 2009).
Other states like Louisiana have historically contributed less than 20% to public defense which
means the counties with the highest number of indigent clients are also the counties least capable
of providing substantial funds to support the public defender office. Not only are public defense
budgets shockingly underfunded, but they are comparatively lower than average budgets given to
prosecutor offices (NRCC, 2009). A report by the NRCC points out, “even conceding that
prosecutors consider some cases that are never charged and that some cases are represented by
retained counsel, financial support of indigent defense typically lags behind that provided for
prosecutors” (2009). The scarce budget leaves public defender offices substantially incapable of
competing on an equal stage with that of the prosecution.
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The lack of funds coincides with an overwhelming and often impossible caseload for
many attorneys. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
established a recommended annual caseload for attorneys in 1973 of no more than 150 felony
cases per lawyer and no more than 400 misdemeanor cases per lawyer (Texas Indigent Defense
Commission (TDIC), 2015). However, the commission accepted these numbers without an
empirical basis for doing so and since this recommendation, the judicial system has undergone a
number of changes requiring a renewed look at indigent caseloads. In 2013 the Texas Indigent
Defense Commission was given the task of establishing new guidelines for caseloads (TIDC,
2015). The commission reported that a 66% increase in time was required for each offense level
and the greatest need of resources to match caseload were in investigations since many attorneys
conducted investigations on their own. The commission based their recommendation for required
time per case on ideal trial rates. The ideal trial rate for misdemeanor offenses fell between 14%
to 20% even though actual trial rates for misdemeanors remained significantly lower with only
1.1% of misdemeanors reaching trial. The commission also urged that 11% to 20% of felony
cases be disposed of by trial even though just 2.5% of these cases reached trial. The
commission’s final caseload recommendation was ultimately made to reflect actual trial rates but
given with instructions to pursue a trial rate more closely aligned with the one recommended by
the panel (TDIC, 2015). Even though the commission recognized the integral role caseload limits
play in ensuring equal representation, guidelines alone cannot achieve the needed reform in
public defense offices but is a significant step in the right direction.
Excessive caseloads can be detrimental to attorneys’ ability to prepare proper
representation and lead to a system that is over reliant on pleas. Numerous testimony by the
American Bar Association demonstrates that the problem of overburdened public defenders
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exists throughout the country (TDIC, 2015). These reports cite examples where some attorneys
have misdemeanor caseloads exceeding 1,000 cases and an example of a Florida public defender
who had 13 felony cases set for court on the same day (TDIC, 2015). As of 2007, only 15% of
county-based public defender offices had defined caseload limits but not all of these had the
authority to refuse excessive caseloads (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009). The Census
found that approximately 73% of county offices exceeded the recommended case load limit per
attorney. Additionally, around 40% of county-based offices lacked investigators to assist with the
pre-trial investigations. Each county varied in how it determined indigence and assigned counsel
but nearly all used income level as the principle criteria for determining indigence (Census of
Public Defender Offices, 2009). The study ultimately found that only 27% of county-based
offices reported a sufficient number of public defenders. Understandably, with the high volume
of cases seen by public defenders each year, there is enormous pressure to plead the cases before
ever coming near a trial. Currently, between 90-95% of defendants plead guilty instead of going
to trial (Devers, 2011). The miniscule number of cases decided by trial can ultimately lead to
alternate case outcomes and allow implicit racial bias to linger in the courts.
Plea bargaining occurs when there is an agreement by the defendant to accept a reduced
charge offered by the prosecution rather than proceeding to trial. Ideally, these agreements would
entail a lessened sentence and incentivize a presumably guilty client to decide against pursuing a
costly and time consuming trial. The concept often used to explain the function of plea bargains
is a term referred to as “the shadows of the trial” (Bibas, 2004). Stephanos Bibas describes this
as the “influence exerted by the strength of the evidence and the expected punishment after trial”
(2004). In theory, plea bargains are supposed to function as a cost and time saving mechanism
utilized when all evidence and factual components of the case show a clear expected outcome of
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guilt. However, as a result of the large caseload and inability of public defenders to efficiently
investigate each case, plea bargains occur far outside the shadow of a trial and are susceptible to
a number of extralegal bias (Bibas, 2004). Prosecutors have a vested interested in maintaining a
high conviction rate which can affect their decision on what cases to attempt to plead and what to
take to trial. Instead of pleading the cases which have the most evidence to support a conviction,
prosecutors will take the assured guilty conviction to trial and attempt to plead out the weaker
cases instead of risking a loss at trial (Bibas, 2004). Public defenders can also be affected by
external factors when determining whether to encourage a client to accept a plea. The low wages
and overburdened workload can influence public defenders to push for a plea rather than spend
the extensive amount of time preparing for trial, resulting in a skewed outcome (Bibas, 2004).
The farther plea bargains get from outside the shadow of a trial, the greater the risk of reaching
an agreement far removed from the actual facts of the case.
Additionally, plea bargains effectively work to remove the adversarial component of the
courtroom. Some critics contend that because of the pressure to process a large number of cases
swiftly, public defenders’ relationship with actors in the courtroom workgroup are better
characterized by cooperation rather than conflict (Bowen, 2009). The courtroom workgroup is
used to describe a cooperation between the prosecutor, public defender, judge, and other
courtroom staff. Instead of advocating zealously on behalf of their clients, public defenders find
themselves in an enigmatic role where they must represent their client without disturbing the
courtroom workgroup. Critics of this system argue that public defenders are “too quick to
bargain away the precious rights of their under-privileged clients” (Albert-Goldberg and
Harman, 1983). This nation’s judicial system was not designed to function in private meetings
between attorneys but as an adversarial institute before a judge, free from extralegal factors.
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Not only does the current court system’s emphasis on plea bargaining shift
outcomes from beneath the shadow of a trial, it also bolsters implicit racial bias into the system.
As Charles Ogletree points out, public defenders are tasked with working to dismantle racial bias
since the burden of the criminal justice system falls “disproportionately on communities of
color” (1995). The Sentencing Project points out that the criminal justice system unjustly affects
racial minorities because of disproportionately higher arrest rates and a median income that is
approximately $20,000 less than white Americans resulting in a far greater number of minorities
in need of indigent defense services (FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2012;
U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The presence of racial disparities in the court system is also evident
in sentencing with a 2000 study showing that even when controlling for “severity of the offense,
defendant’s prior criminal history, and the specific district court’s sentencing tendencies, blacks
received sentences 5.5 months longer than whites and Hispanics received sentences 4.5 months
longer than whites” (Spohn).
Recognizing the role race plays in the criminal justice system is exceedingly relevant to
understanding why a greater emphasis on public defense funding is needed in order to reduce
overuse of guilty pleas. Implicit racial bias is referred to as “the unconscious associations we
make about racial groups” (Richardson and Goff, 2013). This type of bias finds itself most
prevalent in moments where hasty judgements without comprehensive information take place.
Overburdened public defenders can fall prey to the very bias they are tasked with eliminating
when forced to determine which cases to pursue in a short amount of time (Richardson and Goff,
2013). Preparing cases for the rigorous work of trial allows for a heightened attention to facts
and reduces the perpetuation of racial bias within a system already tainted by racial inequality.
Not only are public defenders susceptible to implicit bias when handling cases, but extralegal
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variables such as race also influence prosecutors’ role in determining plea deals. A Bureau of
Justice Assistance report showed that blacks are less likely than whites to receive reduced plea
agreements (Devers, 2011).
The purpose of identifying this literature is not to advocate for the removal of plea
bargains altogether, but rather, to demonstrate how an overreliance on plea bargaining as the
means of disposing of cases alters the indispensable adversarial component of the courtroom and
allows racial bias into a system in which it has no place. As mentioned earlier, the actual trial
rates are far lower than the rates deemed optimal by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission’s
report (2015). My paper seeks to examine the relationship between funds and case load with trial
by jury rates to more clearly understand the necessary steps to achieve the recommended trial
rate. It is my hypothesis that an increase in funding and reduction in caseload will result in an
increase in trial rates.
IV.

Data Description

The Census of Public Defender Offices (CPDO) collected data in 2007 regarding
caseload, funds, staffing, and policies for approximately 1,050 public defender offices
nationwide. For the purposes of this study, CPDO defines public defender offices as those
employing “salaried staff of full- or part-time attorneys to represent indigent clients,” leaving out
attorneys hired through appointed or contractual services (CPD, 2007). Questionnaires were sent
to public defender offices funded at the state and local level, excluding federal offices and any
privately funded office. The study also excluded offices that specialized in in capital appellate, or
juvenile cases. As of 2007, 22 states maintained a state-based program while 27 states and the
District of Columbia relied on county level administration and funding. Maine is not included in
either of these categories because it relies solely on appointed private attorneys. The 22 state-
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based programs retain oversight of administration and funding. The other 27 states have a mix of
15 states that are primarily funded at the county level and 12 states that receive a combination of
state and county funds (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009). These differing public
defender systems governed the manner in which data was collected. State-based systems
responded on behalf of each county and six of the 22 provided overall state data. States with a
county-based public defender system relied on each individual county to complete the
questionnaires for submission. A total of 530 county-based public defender offices responded to
the survey (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009).
In 2007 the Urban Institute collected data for the National Census of State Court
Prosecutors (NCSP-07) on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The survey was sent
through mail to 2,330 chief prosecutor offices throughout the country and approximately 95%
percent of these offices responded. Chief prosecutors for this study can also be referred to as
district, county, commonwealth, or state’s attorney but does not include municipal attorneys who
handle primarily low-level limited jurisdiction cases. The prosecutors’ districts correspond with
county boundaries in approximately 85% of the cases. NCSP-07 looked at a number of factors
such as types of cases and evidence collection methods, but for the purpose of the study, only a
number of factors were used to examine the relationship between public defender funds and case
outcomes. NCSP-07 measured the number of cases closed per attorney by dividing the number
of felony cases closed by each office with the number of FTE prosecuting attorneys on staff in
each office. The proportion of felony cases disposed of by jury verdict was determined by
dividing the number of felony cases closed by number of felony cases closed by trial in each
office (NCSP-07). By using data from the Prosecutors Survey and the Census of Public
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Defenders, I was able to run a regression analysis to indicate the extent, if any, of the relationship
between public defender funding and caseload with case outcomes.
V.

Data Used for Regression Analysis

Although the Census of Public Defender Offices contained data for states with both state
and county-based offices, I only pulled information for county-based states. I chose to only
examine systems operated at the county level because it would allow me to examine the counties
found in the data from both the Census of Public Defender Offices and the NCSP-07 in order to
run a regression analysis. The data set from the Census of Public Defender Offices initially
displayed data on policies and operations of 530 county-based public defender offices operating
in 27 states and the District of Columbia. However, 122 of these districts were dropped because
of problems with the data reported. There is not substantial literature examining the data sets
collected by the 2007 Census of Public Defenders and there appears to be a number of problems
in the data as reported. Due to the lack of current research identifying outliers or problems with
the current data, I was careful to only exclude districts from my research that were missing data
or displayed a clear problem in what data was recorded. I understand this method may be
imperfect, however, it is an attempt to obtain a broad understanding of the relationship between
public defender offices and trial rates as opposed to a more succinct case study of a few counties.
19 of these districts were dropped because of missing budget data and an additional 4 districts
whose budgets reported total budgets below $9,000 were dropped. 18 court districts were
dropped because of missing felony or total caseload. 28 offices were dropped because they either
represented only a portion of a court district (e.g. The Bronx Defenders) or they were state-wide
entities charged with representing only specialized cases such as capital defense. An additional
53 districts were dropped because the public defender districts did not cover the same
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geographically-defined area included in the NCSP-07. This left a total of 408 public defender
districts.
When joined with the NCSP-07 data, several court districts were dropped and other data
modifications were made. The Washington D.C. district was dropped because it operates as both
a local and a federal court district prosecuting criminal and civil cases. 7 court districts were
dropped because of missing budgetary data for Prosecutor’s Offices. 20 other court districts were
dropped based on suspect conviction and trial rates. For example, 13 court districts with
conviction rates below 25% were removed (IL-1; IN-1; LA-2; NY-1; NY-2; PA-4; SC-1; TX-1).
4 court districts with conviction rates above 600% were removed (IL-2; NE-2). 24 court districts
with conviction rates between 109% and 350% were converted to 100% (AL-1; CA-3; FL-2;
GA-2; IL-2; NE-3; NY-3; OH-1; PA-4; TN-2; TX-1). 4 court districts with jury trial rates above
60% were removed (GA-1; OH-2; PA-2). 17 court districts report a trial rate of 0.0% (Id-1; Il-6;
LA-1; NE-7; OH-2). These districts were removed for the purpose of preventing skewed results
in the regression analysis.
Although the number of states with county-based systems is 27, the removed districts
lowered the number of states included in the study to 23, leaving out West Virginia, Oregon,
South Dakota, and Kansas. After eliminating districts with clear problems in the data recorded
from both the Census of Public Defenders and the NCSP-07 and then eliminating those not
present in both data sets, 380 districts remained. The number of counties in each state included in
the study are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Number of Judicial Districts Included by State
Alabama

3

Nevada

3

Arizona
California
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
Michigan
Mississippi

9
35
15
30
3
56
8
24
4
1

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Washington

36
4
2
28
50
7
24
6
3
6

Nebraska

22

The initial characteristics evident when examining public defender offices and prosecutor
offices recorded in the data sets used for this study showed disparities in funding levels and
caseloads between the two offices (see Table 2-1 and 2-2). Full time attorney was recorded by
dividing the hours worked by part-time attorneys by the standard number of hours for a full time
employee (40 hours per week) and then adding the resulting quotient to the number of full-time
attorneys (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009; NCSP, 2007). The average number of
felony cases per litigating attorney in a public defender office was consistently higher than that
of prosecutors in offices with similar total caseloads. Offices with caseloads of less than 1,000
cases found that the average felony case load per public defender was 97 compared to a
prosecutor who averaged 80 felony cases per year. In offices with an average caseload between
2,000-5,000, the disparity reduced with public defenders averaging only 6 fewer cases than
prosecutors. However, this disparity is most heavily contrasted in offices averaging over 5,000
cases with public defenders maintaining an average felony caseload of 159, 48 more cases than
the prosecutor’s average of 111 felony cases per year.
14
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Not only is the disparity between public defenders and prosecutors evident through
caseload level, but the data also shows disparity in funding per felony case. Budget per case
recorded in both the Census of Public Defender Offices and the NCSP-07 accounted for all
expenditures within the office such as investigations, litigating staff, and any additional staff or
administration (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009; NCSP, 2007). The average budget per
felony case for all public defender offices is $1,491 which is nearly half the size of the average
budget available to prosecutors per felony case. The average budget per felony case for
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prosecutors is listed as $2,950 and ranges up to $3,4808 per felony case in offices with more than
5,000 cases each year.

The average budget per litigating attorney in the 380 counties used for this study showed
consistent differences between public defender and prosecutor offices regardless of caseload
within the offices. The average budget per litigating attorney in public defender offices was
listed at $121, 942, substantially lower than the average budget of $174,787 per litigating
attorney for prosecution. Budget per litigating attorney experiences the starkest contrast in public
defender and prosecutor offices with caseloads greater than 5,000, consistent with the disparities
seen between the two offices regarding caseload and budget per felony case. It is important to
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point out that the disparity between the two offices is often defended because prosecution
handles a number of cases not represented by public defense. These are cases where there is
ultimately no charge filed or cases that are represented by private counsel. However, even when
considering these additional cases, the National Right to Counsel Committee reports that
“financial support of indigent defense typically lags well behind that provided for prosecutors”
(2009). Additionally, it is important to note that the counties in this study with consistently
lower budgets per public defender were typically found in rural regions with lower caseloads.
Most likely, these regions also offered a reduced cost of living as compared to public defender
offices in larger cities.
The general characteristics found in the 380 counties used for this study remained in line
with the literature and the overall reports from both the Census of Public Defender Offices and
the NCSP-07 that describe public defense offices characterized by low budgets. A 2007 study
conducted in Tennessee examined both state and non-state funds used for prosecution and
defense of indigent cases. The study reported that total prosecution funding ranged between $130
million and $139 million during 2005. In comparison, funding for indigent defense was found to
be only approximately $56.4 million in the same year, a difference of over $73 million
(Spangenberg Group, 2007). Another study in California found that when comparing prosecution
and public defense budgets between 2006-2007, indigent defense was “under-funded statewide
by at least 300 million dollars” (Benner, 2007). Although not mentioned in the tables,
prosecution benefits from additional access to a number of resources provided by crime labs, law
enforcement, and special investigators not guaranteed to the defense (National Right to Counsel,
2009). The data found in the 380 cases used for analysis are consistent with the overall trends of
data collected.
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VI.

Results

Using the data collected from counties found in both the Census of Public Defender
Offices and NCSP-07, I then ran a regression analysis to examine the statistical relationship
between funding and caseloads of county level public defender offices and the trial rate within
the county. My hypothesis that increased funding and reduced caseloads in public defender
offices would increase jury trial rates was, however, not supported in the findings with the
regression analysis showing no significant relationship between these variables. Even when
analyzing conviction rates and jury trial rates separately as the dependent variable, the data
showed no statistical significance to support my thesis. (See Table 3 for Impact on Jury Trial
Rates and Table 4 for Impact on Conviction Rates.)
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The analysis measuring impact on jury trial rates shows that budget per defender and
budget per felony case have no statistical relationship with the change in jury trial rates. Separate
analysis based on size of public defender district maintains this same finding contending that
funding is not a significant variable in increasing the jury trial rates. Additionally, county
districts as compared to hybrid districts (districts funded and overseen by a combination of both
county and state level administration) provides no substantial difference in measuring the impact
of funding on jury trial rates. Felony load per public defender also does not have a statistical
impact on jury trial rates either.
In contrast, budget per felony case and felony case load for prosecutors’ offices did show
a relationship. Felony load per prosecutor recorded a strong inverse correlation with jury trial
rates. As felony load decreased, the jury trial rate increased substantially. The only categories
where this trend did not occur was in hybrid districts and prosecutor districts found in urban
areas. Budget per felony case in prosecutor offices showed a correlation with the increase in jury
trial rates overall but was most clearly seen in hybrid districts and medium sized districts which
have a population of between 100,000-249,000 (NCSP, 07). The regression analysis examining
impact on jury trial ultimately establishes no reason to identify funding and caseload within
public defender offices as principle factors in determining the most efficient policy reform
necessary to increase jury trial rates as suggested by the Texas Indigent Defense Conviction in
2015.
The regression analysis examining conviction rates as the dependent variable (Table 4)
again finds no statistical significance in increased funding for public defenders and reduced
conviction rates. The only district showing any significance is seen in hybrid districts. Regarding
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prosecution, felony load per prosecutor does indicate an inverse statistical relationship regarding
conviction rates with the strongest again taking place in hybrid districts.
Although the findings from the regression analysis do not support my hypothesis, I do not
believe it is a result of problems in the statistical analysis. The districts dropped from the data
because they were not present in both the Census of Public Defender Offices and NCSP-07
appeared to occur randomly, giving no reason to suspect that this would impact the findings.
Additionally, variance inflation factor tests indicate no problem with multicollinearity. In
analysis with each of the defender or prosecutor variables included one or two at a time, similar
results as reported were found. Tests for heteroscedasticity did indicate a problem so the results
reported include robust standard errors. Still, the results were only moderately impacted.
The literature overwhelmingly indicates lack of funds and high caseloads as the main
contributing factors to the problems associated with public defense. According to the literature
discussed in this particular study, these factors appear to lead to low jury trial rates which
effectively alter the adversarial component of trial and permit unconscious racial bias into the
courtroom. Yet, the regression analysis consisting of over 380 counties does not support this
argument. It is possible that many of the counties that were dropped due to errors with data
recorded or counties who chose not to participate in the Census altogether represented the lowest
funded counties. High caseloads and little pay to support litigating staff could have prevented
these offices from participating in the study and consequently out of the regression analysis.
However, as previously mentioned, the counties that were dropped from the final regression
analysis occurred randomly which would not have made a significant impact on the results as
shown.
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It is also important to consider the data not visible when measuring only for variances in
jury trial and conviction rates. Jury trial rates alone do not show any signs of difference in the
handling of cases leading up to a trial or plea deal. One of the main criticisms Stephanos Bibas
made about the problem with a system over reliant on plea deals is not necessarily with the
action of pleas itself, but that they too often occur outside the scope of a trial (2004). It is
possible to have an increase in the amount of pleas taking place based on substantial evidence as
a result of increased funds without this being recorded in the data. Nevertheless, increased funds
for public defender offices and reduced caseloads do not prove to have statistical significance in
ever increasing trial rates as recommended by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission. Another
point to consider when weighing the implications of the analysis is whether the better funded
public defender offices serve as an adequate point of reference for achieving the desired jury trial
rate. More than 70% of counties participating in the 2007 census reported having insufficient
number of attorneys to meet the standard guidelines (Census of Public Defender Offices, 2009).
Prosecutor offices consistently having an overall higher budget when compared to public
defender offices could potentially serve as a factor in explaining the findings that were not in line
with the hypothesis. Although there are a number of complex factors that could work to explain
the findings of the regression analysis, it is apparent that my thesis overestimated how much
caseload and budget affected jury trial rate.
Although these two variables might play a role in achieving the recommended jury trial
rate, it is clear that these are not the driving policy reforms necessary to achieve the suggested
rate. In theory we can see these factors serving as necessary components for reform, but practice
does not indicate the strong correlation. Perhaps what is necessary to reduce the overreliance on
plea bargains is a combination of reforms that work to alter the atmosphere and improve skill
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sets found in public defender offices. The Public Defender Service (PDS) for the District of
Columbia depicts a number of the practical reforms that must occur alongside changes to funds
and caseload for there to be a significant effect on increasing trial rates and reducing conviction
rates. This public defender office is often seen as the gold standard for how other public defender
offices should be modeled. According to the Census for Public Defender Offices, PDS has an
average budget per felony case of $19,199, remarkably higher than the $1,491 average budget
per felony case of the counties used in this study. Public defenders at PDS average only 13
felony cases per defender compared to the average of 138 felony cases (Census of Public
Defender Offices, 2009). Correspondingly, felony trial rates in the District of Columbia are
recorded at 20.8% with a felony conviction rate of 83.3% (Census of Public Defender Offices,
2009). These rates are more closely aligned with the recommended trial rates that work to
maintain the adversarial component of the courtroom that ensures exceptional advocacy on
behalf of the client and thwart racial bias.
Charles Ogletree identifies a number of factors that work to create a public defender
office with trial rates at the recommended rate. Although he identifies the importance of
adequate funds and reduced caseloads, Ogletree emphasizes the integral component training
plays in maintaining the office’s success (1995). PDS provides expert and practical training at
the start of employment and continues training to keep staff attorneys up to date on changes in
law. Public defenders are also provided training in the area of investigations along with ample
access to investigators and interns to assist with this component of trial preparation (Ogletree,
1995). Attorneys are taught to prepare each case as if it is going to trial with the office
emphasizing thoroughness with each case. PDS also provides a unique office culture that
cultivates a community of staff encouraged to seek high quality representation. Unlike burnout
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that occurs at high rates in many public defender offices, the supportive culture of PDS works to
prevent high attrition rates (Ogletree, 1995). From this example it is clear that adequate funds
and reasonable caseloads are not the primary factors that work to achieve the recommended trial
rate but rather the culmination of numerous components that work to establish effective indigent
representation. Perhaps my thesis overstated the impact of budget and caseload on the intended
trial rate when the complex issue requires comprehensive, not isolated, change.
VII.

Conclusion

The judicial system’s commitment to upholding justice relies on the right to legal counsel
regardless of financial ability. Unfortunately, this is a right far too often recognized in theory but
not adequately implemented into practice. To keep pace with rising incarceration rates filling
court dockets across the country, plea bargains have become the most common and swiftest
means of closing cases. This overreliance on plea bargains without sufficient investigations and
consideration of evidence has effectively altered the adversarial character of the courtroom and
allowed racial bias to impact cases before ever reaching trial. In order to prevent these problems
from continuing, it is crucial that jury trial rates experience a growth which could occur as a
result of changes to the current public defender systems across the country. Unlike my thesis
presumed, simply increasing funds for public defender offices and reducing caseloads will not
suffice as the much needed reform. Instead, there must be a comprehensive reform that perhaps
includes a reform in the training, office atmosphere, and resources in public defender offices
everywhere.

25

Running Head: Impact on Trial Rates
References
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 US 654 (2002)
Albert-Goldberg, N., & Hartman, M. 1983. “The public defender in America. In The Defense
Counsel.” William F. McDonald (ed.). Beverly Hills, CA.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)
Argersinger and Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
Benner, Laurence A. and Lorenda S. Stern. 2007. “Systemic Factors Affecting the Quality of
Criminal Defense Representation: Supplemental Report to The California Commission
on The Fair Administration of Justice.” Prepared for Tennessee Justice Project.
Bibas, Stephanos, "Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial" (2004). Harvard Law Review.
Faculty Scholarship. 924. http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/924
Bowen, D. M. (2009). “Calling your bluff: How prosecutors and defense attorneys adapt plea
bargaining strategies to increase formalization.” Justice Quarterly 26, 2−29.
Census of Public Defender Offices: County-based Offices. 2007. United States Department of
Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. ICPSR29501-v1. Ann
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor],
2011-05-13. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR29501.v1
Devers, Lindsey. 2011. “Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary.” U.S. Department of
Justice.
FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division. 2012. Crime in the United States:2011.
Uniform Crime Report.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
Hartley, Richard D., Holly Ventura Miller, and Cassia Spohn. 2010. “Do You Get What You Pay
for? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal Court Outcomes.” Journal of Criminal
Justice 38:1063-1070.
Lucas, Lauren Sudeall. 2013. “Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform.”
Minnesota Law Review 97:1197-1267.
National Census of State Prosecutors. 2007. United States Department of Justice. Office of
Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. ICPSR33202-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2012-05-14.
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR33202.v1

26

Running Head: Impact on Trial Rates
National Right to Counsel Committee. 2009. “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of
Our Constitutional Right to Counsel.” The Constitution Project.
Ogletree, Charles J. 1995. “An Essay on the New Public Defender for The 21st Century.” Law
and Contemporary Problems 58:1:81-93.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
Richardson, L. Song and Phillip Atiba Goff. 2013. “Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage.” The Yale Law Journal 122:2626-2649.
The Sentencing Project. 2015. “Trends in U.S. Corrections.” Retrieved Feb. 8, 2017.
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-USCorrections.pdf
The Spangenberg Group. 2007. “Resources of the Prosecution and Indigent Defense Functions
in Tennessee.” http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/
TN_CompStudyFINAL_7.30.07.pdf.
Spohn, Cassia. 2000. “Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral
Sentencing Process.” Criminal Justice 2000 40:3 p.55-56.
Texas Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC). 2015. “Guidelines for Indigent Defense
Caseloads.” Public Policy Research Institute.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2010. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2011.

27

